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Why has the share of training firms declined
in Switzerland?*
Juerg Schweri and Barbara Mueller
The Swiss mass apprenticeship system is market based. The share of training firms as
a percentage of all firms is therefore an indicator which receives much public attention.
The share of training firms declined markedly from 1985 to 2001, dropping from 24.7
to 17.6%. This has often been interpreted as a sign of firms’ decreasing willingness to
train apprentices. We use data from the firm census to assess whether the decline in
the share of training firms can instead be explained by a range of independent vari-
ables. Besides firm characteristics and regional variables, we include supply-side factors
such as demographic developments in the relevant age cohorts, which have been ig-
nored in the empirical literature so far. Using pooled probit models, fixed-effects mod-
els and a Blinder-Oaxaca type decomposition, we are able to explain the variation in
the share of training firms over time to a large extent. The main reasons for the de-
crease are increasing numbers of very small firms, shifts in industry composition, a
reduction in the number of young people and an increasing share of young people
going to grammar school. We discuss these developments in turn and conclude that
they do not, in our opinion, provide sufficient reasons for state interventions in the
apprenticeship market.
* This paper was released for publication in April 2007.
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1 Introduction1
The literature on training, especially on apprentice-
ship training as it can be found in German-speaking
countries, has increased steadily in the last decade.
New theoretical models concerning firms’ motiva-
tions to train (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998 and 1999,
Leuven 2005) are sometimes referred to as “new
training literature” (Gerfin 2004). Despite this lit-
erature, our empirical knowledge about apprentice-
ship training systems is still very limited. Firstly, con-
vincing empirical tests of the new theoretical models
are still rare. Secondly, the longitudinal dynamics of
the system have seldom been investigated. In this
article, we focus on the second topic.
In Switzerland, apprenticeships are followed by al-
most two thirds of a cohort and constitute the main
pathway of young people into the labour market.
The fluctuation on the apprenticeship market leads
to intense discussions in politics and the media; simi-
lar discussions are underway in Germany and Aus-
tria, too.
The quantitative importance of problems in the ap-
prenticeship market is controversial. The most im-
portant question from a policy point of view is
whether the system is able to integrate as many
young people aged between 15 and 19 as possible in
post-compulsory education or training. Unfortu-
nately, the precise number of young people who
look for an apprenticeship place but cannot find one
is unknown. There are two relevant surveys which
provide partial answers: the “Lehrstellenbarometer”
(apprenticeship barometer) is an annual cross-sec-
tion survey that gives an indication of how many
young people are still looking for an apprenticeship
place in April (1st survey) and in August (2nd sur-
vey). This survey has been carried out since 1997.
Of those young people looking for an apprentice-
ship place at the beginning of the year, around 12 to
15 percent had only received a place in a one-year
preparatory course or had found no solution at all
by August. This share remained constant between
1997 and 2001, the time span we are analysing
(OPET 2001). A longitudinal youth survey found
that 5 percent of the young people interviewed ei-
ther had not started or had dropped out of any post-
compulsory education or training two years after
finishing compulsory schooling (FSO/TREE 2003).
Although these figures seem quite low in compari-
son with other countries2, they still indicate that
1 We thank Carsten Kuechler, Jens Mohrenweiser, Fulvio Mula-
tero and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Any er-
rors are ours.
2 The youth unemployment rate of people below the age of 25
was about 3% percent in 1999 (Weber 2004), lower than in any of
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there remains a segment of young people who can-
not be integrated into the apprenticeship system.3
Public discussions are therefore intense and a huge
number of political initiatives have been launched at
federal and cantonal level, many of them demanding
state intervention in the apprenticeship market.
Many different “solutions” are being discussed, such
as firm subsidies, tax relief or the expansion of full-
time schooling. One important reason put forward
in favour of such policy interventions is that firms
do not train enough apprentices and, in particular,
that their training propensity has declined over time.
According to this argument, some young people do
not find apprenticeship places because firms’ will-
ingness to train has decreased. This decline is diag-
nosed from a simple descriptive indicator, the share
of training firms in the economy.
We focus on this argument and show that the causes
of the decline in this indicator have to be analysed
before far-reaching conclusions can be drawn. To
this end, we analyse firms’ decisions to train appren-
tices and try to explain the variation over time in
the share of training firms using different groups of
explanatory variables. An important group of vari-
ables that has been largely ignored in political dis-
cussions as well as in empirical research is that of
supply-side factors. In Switzerland, most young peo-
ple start an apprenticeship directly after compulsory
schooling. Therefore, the number of young people
looking for apprenticeship places is strongly influ-
enced by demographic development. As we will
show, supply-side factors have sizeable effects on the
training probability of firms and its variation over
time. Taking supply-side factors into account, con-
clusions drawn from the empirical analysis will
change substantially.
Standard human capital theory predicts that firms
do not pay for general training (Becker 1962). The
reason is that firms cannot extract a rent from
skilled workers when labour markets are competi-
tive, so they cannot recoup an investment during the
apprenticeship period. The new training literature
analyses frictional labour markets instead, which
provide a rationale for firm investment in general
training. Labour market frictions lead to a com-
pressed wage structure (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998
and 1999), which means that skilled workers can be
paid below their marginal product. The rent accrued
from this gap grows with workers’ training, giving
firms an incentive to invest in the training of their
the countries considered in the overview article by Ryan (2001):
France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, UK, USA.
3 It has to be considered, though, that the aim of post-compulsory
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employees as long as the marginal cost of training is
lower than the marginal rent. The training provided
in frictional labour markets will, however, remain
below the social optimum that is achieved in com-
petitive labour markets where individuals pay for
their training.
Since labour market frictions (information asymme-
tries, transaction costs, dismissal laws, collective
agreements, unionisation) are likely to exist to some
degree in reality, firms have a choice about how to
train apprentices: they can either pay moderate sala-
ries and place the focus on the productive work of
apprentices such that all expenses are covered dur-
ing the training period. Then there is no necessity
to keep on apprentices as skilled workers after the
apprenticeship period. Or firms decide to invest in
apprentices during the apprenticeship period in
which case they have to make sure that enough ap-
prentices remain with the firm as skilled workers in
order to extract rents that cover the costs. The latter
strategy is, however, hardly feasible for small firms
which do not want to grow, since most of them do
not have jobs in which to keep the apprentices after
the training period.
There is a limited number of studies that attempt
to test the premises of the new training literature
(Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Dustmann and
Schoenberg 2004, Beckmann 2002). Most of the
studies compare the wages of apprentices who
stayed with their training firm (stayers) with those
who left (movers). Depending on the exact assump-
tions about the labour market frictions, different hy-
potheses about movers’ and stayers’ wages emerge.
The mover-stayer literature is, however, far from
conclusive (see Clark 2002). Another strand of em-
pirical literature has tried to explain the determi-
nants of firms’ training activity directly (without
testing the theories mentioned above, though). Neu-
baeumer and Bellmann (1999) and Franz and Zim-
mermann (2000) used cross-sectional data for Ger-
many. Muehlemann et al. (2007) estimated the de-
mand for apprentices with a cross-sectional data set
containing information on the cost and benefit of
apprenticeship training for Swiss firms. Stoeger and
Winter-Ebmer (2001) analysed longitudinal data for
Austria and found a negative time trend in training
activity. They did not include supply-side factors,
however. Muehlemann and Wolter (2007) include
demography in a cross-sectional analysis for Switz-
erland exploiting regional variation in firms’ training
activity.
In this paper, we use a longitudinal data set to ana-
lyse whether the change in the aggregate training
activity of Swiss firms can be explained by demand-
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side variables (for which effects have been found in
the above-mentioned papers) as well as supply-side
variables. The paper is organised as follows: section
2 introduces the Swiss apprenticeship system. The
estimation strategy is presented in section 3. Section
4 describes the data used for the analyses and pre-
sents the hypotheses to be tested. Section 5 contains
the empirical results, section 6 concludes the paper
with a discussion.
2 The Swiss apprenticeship training
system
The apprenticeship system is the route chosen by
most young Swiss people at upper secondary level.
Around 60% of young people who complete their
compulsory schooling choose to embark on what is
called the dual training system, that is, a training
programme combining vocational education at
school with training in and work for a company. Al-
most half of the remaining 40% of young people
who complete compulsory education go on to attend
grammar school (Gymnasium) to prepare them for
university and a more academic career. The remain-
der (just over 20%) opt either for other entirely
school-based forms of education or (less than 10%
of a cohort of 16-year-olds) pursue no form of post-
compulsory education. This ranks Switzerland ahead
of other OECD countries in terms of the percentage
of the over-16 population attending school.
The apprenticeship system is market based: young
people have no guarantee of receiving an appren-
ticeship place, nor are firms obliged to train appren-
tices. The apprenticeship market can therefore be
seen as a sub-market of the labour market. Al-
though employers’ organisations often issue salary
recommendations for apprentices, apprentices’ sala-
ries are determined by the employing company and
not regulated by law or on the basis of collective
agreements (“Tarifvertrag”) between trade union
federations and employers’ federations.
It is crucial for the justification of our estimation
strategy that the apprenticeship market works as a
market and is not dominated by state or associa-
tions’ regulations (e.g. by means of collusion).4
Therefore, we present data on the wage variance on
the apprenticeship market. We use a cross-sectional
data set from Schweri et al. (2003) where 2352 Swiss
4 Apart from the definition of occupations, certificates and the
length of apprenticeships, of course (concerning this kind of basic
regulation necessary to establish a mass apprenticeship system,
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firms were asked about the cost and benefit of their
apprenticeship training programs (see also Wolter et
al. 2006). Figure 1 shows the wage variance between
the most important occupations in terms of numbers
of apprentices. Although wages do not vary within
one firm for apprentices in the same occupation, fig-
ure 1 exhibits a high degree of wage variance within
as well as between occupations, as can be expected
in a free market where wages adapt to differing con-
ditions and scarcities between occupations, indus-
tries, regions and individual firms.5
Vocational training in a dual-training programme
usually lasts three to four years. A few of the ap-
proximately 250 occupations (mostly in the retail
sector) permitted an apprenticeship period of just
two years in the past. Firms report fairly low drop-
out rates of around 5% (Schweri et al. 2003).
Apprentices graduate with a diploma recognized
throughout Switzerland attesting that the apprentice
has a vocational qualification. After or during an ap-
prenticeship, a qualification called a “Berufsmatur”
5 Mason apprentices earn exceptionally high wages since skilled
masons earn relatively high wages as well. The opposite is true
for hairdressers Ð the small median wage also explains why the
dispersion looks rather small in absolute terms. The auto me-
chanic occupation seems to be an exception to the rule of sizeable
wage dispersion even within occupations.
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(professional baccalaureate) may be acquired, which
additionally entitles the apprentice to begin third-
level education at a university of applied sciences
leading to a Bachelor degree. The quality of the
training provided in Switzerland, which combines
school lessons (1Ð2 days a week) with on-the-job
training in a firm under the supervision of certified
staff, is recognized internationally as meeting top
standards.6
The employment period ends automatically on com-
pletion of training. Any extension of the employ-
ment period (making the apprentice a fully-fledged
employee) must be negotiated in a separate con-
tract. Mobility is fairly high among young people
who complete their apprenticeships, with only 36%
still working at their original training site one year
on (Schweri et al. 2003).
Most firms in Switzerland succeed in covering all of
the costs related to training with the apprentices’
productive work during the apprenticeship period
6 Few descriptions of the Swiss vocational education and training
system exist in English. For example, the international review of
the vocational education literature by Ryan (1998) does not men-
tion Switzerland. For a qualitative comparison of vocational edu-
cation and training in Switzerland and the UK, see Bierhoff and
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(Schweri et al. 2003). For training firms, apprentice-
ships result in (small) net gains for the firm on aver-
age. This result is in line with Becker’s classical pre-
diction that apprentices will pay for general training
through a low training wage (Becker 1962). The
models of the new training literature, according to
which firms pay for general training due to com-
pressed wage structures, seem less important to de-
scribe actual firm behaviour in Switzerland. But
even in Switzerland the result of net gains from
training would not hold for non-training firms if
they were to take up apprenticeship training, as has
been shown in Wolter et al. (2006). The decision to
train is at least partly based on the net cost or net
gain that firms expect from training apprentices
(Muehlemann et al. 2007). This is another piece of
evidence showing that the Swiss apprenticeship sys-
tem is shaped by economic market forces. The situa-
tion in Germany differs in this respect: although the
institutional features of the Swiss apprenticeship
system are very similar to those in Germany, the
functioning of the systems seems to be less compara-
ble. In Germany, the productive contribution of ap-
prentices amounts to only half of the gross cost of
training, resulting in substantial net cost for an aver-
age apprenticeship (Beicht et al. 2004).
A possible explanation for these differences is that
the Swiss labour market is much less regulated than
the German one, forcing firms to make productive
use of the apprentices to cover costs. By contrast,
many large German firms can afford to train ap-
prentices without integrating them in the production
process since their mobility after the apprenticeship
period is reduced by labour market regulations. If
labour markets are frictional, firms can recoup their
training investment by keeping their apprentices as
skilled workers (see introduction). Indeed, more
than 50% of German apprentices (as opposed to
36% for Switzerland) are still employed by their
original training firm one year on (Beicht et al.
2004). These differences suggest that frictional la-
bour markets are an important explanation for
firms’ training propensity in Germany, while the
Swiss apprenticeship system relies more on market
forces.7
7 This is not to say that Swiss labour markets are entirely friction-
less or that the concept of a compressed wage structure is useless
for Switzerland. Actually, one third of Swiss apprentices cause net
costs for their training firms that have to be recouped somehow
(Schweri et al. 2003). But in Germany, the vast majority of firms
faces net costs during the apprenticeship period, and trade unions,
dismissal laws and other labour market institutions (see Soskice
1994 and Franz and Soskice 1995) introduce frictions that are
largely absent in Switzerland.
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3 Estimation strategy
As discussed in the previous section, the Swiss ap-
prenticeship market relies strongly on market for-
ces. The number of apprenticeship places in the
economy is thus determined by supply and demand
on the apprenticeship market. The share of training
firms is a result of the market outcome. To test
whether firms’ propensity to train has declined, we
want to estimate firms’ demand for apprentices.
With the firm-level data we describe in section 4,
we would therefore like to estimate a firm demand
function:
Ad
it = γt + γwwit + Xd
itγ d + μit (1)
Ad
it denotes the number of apprentices demanded by
firm i in period t, which depends on wage w and
demand-side factors X, e.g. firm characteristics. For
now, we assume the effect of the independent varia-
bles to be constant over time, which is why the re-
spective coefficients do not have a subscript t.
In order to identify this classical firm demand func-
tion, one has to deal with the problem of the simul-
taneous determination of the observable combina-
tions of {Ait, wit} in equilibrium. The supply side is
represented by:
As
it = δt + δwwit + Xs
itδs + νit (2)
Since Ad
it = As
it in equilibrium, wit is endogenous in
equation (1). The classical solution is to use supply
shifters Xs
it as instruments for wit in the demand
equation (1). Our data set (see section 4) provides
us with supply shifters, but not with wage data. We
therefore cannot estimate the structural equation
(1) and instead estimate the reduced form equation
where the endogenous variable Ait is regressed on
all available exogenous variables:
Ait =  t + Xs
it s + Xd
it d + εit (3)
Our main interest lies in the intercepts and the year
dummies respectively. The allegation discussed in
the media (see the introduction) is that the firms’
willingness to train has declined over time. Assum-
ing that no relevant time-variant variables have
been omitted from the X matrices, this corresponds
to the hypothesis that  t is declining for higher t.
Supply shifters will be the share of 16-year-olds in a
region and the share of grammar school pupils in a
region. Both variables vary between regions as well
as over time and have an influence on the number
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We are not aware of any literature on the German-
speaking apprenticeship systems that has included
supply-side factors in the analysis. Our hypothesis is
that an increase in the number of young people or
a decrease in the share of grammar school pupils
will lead to more training places: since most new
apprentices are around 16 years old, an increase in
their number leads to a shift in the supply curve. In
equilibrium, wages will fall and more training con-
tracts will be concluded.
We are especially interested to see whether the in-
clusion of supply-side factors significantly reduces
the unexplained differences between time periods
and thus changes our interpretation concerning the
above-mentioned hypothesis on the differences be-
tween the  t. The hypotheses on the effect of the
demand-side independent variables, i.e. on the  d,
are discussed in the next section where we present
the data set.
Equation (3) can in principle be estimated by
pooled OLS. Another problem, however, is that the
decision of a firm to train one apprentice instead of
zero (i.e., to become a training firm) might be differ-
ent from the decision to train six instead of five ap-
prentices. One reason for this could be fixed entry
costs when initiating training for the first time. The
literature therefore typically uses two-step models




0i fAit =0 Ó
Neubaeumer and Bellmann (1999) perform a probit
estimation of Iit followed by an OLS estimation of
Ait using only the training firms. Franz and Zimmer-
mann (2000) as well as Stoeger and Winter-Ebmer
(2001) use the probit as the first step of a Heckman
two-step estimation. In the second step, the number
of apprentices in training firms is analysed, taking
into account the self-selection of training firms in
the first step. For the hurdle or count data modelling
approach see Muehlemann et al. (2007).
In this paper, we concentrate on the probit estima-
tion of Iit. As we show in the next section, most of
the variation over time stems from firms’ changing
training propensities and not from changes in the
number of apprentices trained by training firms. The
number of apprentices trained, given that a firm
trains, has hardly changed.8
8 Estimation results for the share of apprentices among all em-
ployees in a firm have been published in Mueller and Schweri
(2006). The results do not alter our main conclusions, we do not,
for example, find a time trend in these estimations, either.
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Unobserved heterogeneity is an obvious problem in
our estimations. As discussed in section 4, only a
limited number of independent variables are avail-
able. Many firm characteristics might influence the
training decision but are not observed in our data. If
these unobserved variables are correlated with the
independent variables, the estimation is biased.9 As-
suming that the unobserved firm characteristics are
constant over time, we can time-demean all vari-
ables in equation (3)10 for each firm and thus get
rid of the firm fixed effects. Because of the dummy
dependent variable, we estimate a fixed-effects
model based on a linear probability model.11
Another problem of equation (3) is that the appren-
ticeship market might not be homogenous. There
are about 250 different occupations which require
very different levels and combinations of cognitive
and manual skills (see section 2). Demography
might, for example, have differential effects for dif-
ferent occupations, which are distributed unevenly
across the sectors of the economy. We therefore test
for interaction effects between the variables of the
two X vectors representing the supply and the de-
mand side.
After discussing the results of the pooled and fixed-
effects models, we go on to assess the relative impor-
tance of the different variables for explaining the
decrease in the share of training firms from 1985 to
2001. To this end, we use the decomposition intro-
duced by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973)12:
I ¯01 - I ¯85 =   ˆ 01X01 -   ˆ 85X85 +   ˆ 85X01 -   ˆ 85X01
(4)
I ¯01 - I ¯85 =(   ˆ 01 -   ˆ 85)X01 +( X01 - X85)  ˆ 85
The decrease in the share of training firms is thus
decomposed into one part explained by changes in
the distribution of independent variables (second
part of equation 4) and another part that cannot be
explained and is attributed to a change in the coeffi-
cients (first part of equation 4). The decomposition
9 The outcome of a Hausman test suggests that this correlation
does exist (p = 0.0000) and that a fixed-effects model should
therefore be preferred over an (inconsistent) random effects
model.
10 With slight modifications in formula (3): we will use the train-
ing propensity Iit instead of Ait as the dependent variable, and
non-linear models instead of OLS.
11 The alternative is to estimate a conditional logit fixed-effects
model (see e.g. Wooldridge 2002). In this model, only the obser-
vations that show a change in the dependent variable over time
are included. Since many firms in our sample either always train
or never train, we would lose about 80 percent of all observations.
12 In fact, the decomposition can be used for any combination of
the four points in time under scrutiny. We use the two extreme
points in time (1985 and 2001) in the formulas to simplify the
discussion.Juerg Schweri and Barbara Mueller Why has the share of training firms declined in Switzerland?
can also be applied to non-linear models with di-
chotomous dependent variables. The decomposition
can then be written as (Fairlie 2003):
I ¯01  I ¯85 
N01
i1














F(X 85  ˆ 85)
N85 
(5)
The basic idea is the same as above. Equation (4) is
not valid for non-linear models since I ¯= F(X ) does
not necessarily hold as in linear models. Equation
(5) therefore uses the sample means of the firms’
training probabilities F(·) to decompose the differ-
ence in the share of training firms between the two
years into an unexplained part and a part explained
by all of the independent variables together.
This technique makes it possible to further decom-
pose the explained part and to identify the relative
contribution of each independent variable to the to-
tal decrease. The empirical importance of supply-
side factors can thus be compared with that of the
demand-side factors. The linear decomposition for
the single variables can easily be seen in the second
part of equation (4): the changes in the independent
variables are multiplied by the respective coeffi-
cients, the total explained change thus results from
the sum of the changes caused by the individual in-
dependent variables. In non-linear models, the inde-
pendent contribution of one variable depends on
the value of the other variables through the respec-
tive non-linear function.13 The contribution of a sin-
gle variable to the difference in firms’ training
shares is therefore evaluated by holding the distribu-
tion of the other variables constant (see Fairlie
2003).
4 The data and hypotheses
Our basic data set consists of the firm census data
of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. We exploit a
question about whether a firm had employed one or
more apprentices.14 So far, the firm census has been
13 We do not enter into the details of the technique that are dis-
cussed in Fairlie (2003). E.g., equation (5) does not hold exactly
for probit models, but typically holds very closely. Furthermore,
the equation has to be adapted for N85  N01.
14 The formulation of the question was “Wie viele Lehrlinge
beschäftigt diese Arbeitsstätte?” (How many apprentices does
this establishment employ?). An explanation specified who ex-
actly counts as an apprentice: “Als Lehrling gilt, wer aufgrund
eines Lehrvertrags einen dem Berufsbildungsgesetz oder entspre-
chenden kantonalen Gesetzen unterstellten Beruf erlernt. Eben-
falls als Lehrlinge zu zählen sind die Personen, die eine Anlehre
absolvieren.“ (Anyone who, on the basis of an apprenticeship
contract, is learning an occupation subordinated to the Vocational
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carried out in 1985, 1991, 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2005.
The question about apprentices was not asked in
1991. The 2005 data were not yet available when this
article was written. We can thus use the firm census
data for the years 1985, 1995, 1998 and 2001. A ma-
jor advantage of the data is that the firm census en-
compasses all Swiss firms. We can include in the
analyses the full population of Swiss firms in the
available years. Since we can also trace firms that
existed in more than one of these years, we can con-
struct a panel data set that does not suffer from at-
trition due to non-response. The survey frequency
of one census every three to four years is not a prob-
lem for our purposes since apprenticeships last three
to four years. The large gap between 1985 and 1995
is unfortunate, and more survey times (before 1985
and after 2001) would admittedly have enhanced the
analytical possibilities. The advantage of a popula-
tion data set also comes at the price of a reduced
set of variables.15
Descriptive information on the training activities of
firms is presented in figure 2. It shows how the share
of training firms16 has evolved over time (bright
bars). There was a sharp decline between 1985 and
1995, then the share of training firms grew again.
Between 1985 and 2001, the indicator still shows a
decline of 7.1 percentage points, which led to public
debates about firms’ willingness to train apprentices
as mentioned in the introduction.
The mean share of apprentices17 in the training
firms (grey bars) has hardly changed over time. The
variation in the share of apprentices among the total
of the employees in the economy (black bars) is
caused by the variation in the share of training firms.
The share of training firms variable will therefore be
the dependent variable in our estimations.18
The following independent variables are available
from the firm census data: firm size, industry, firm
type (independent firm, headquarters or branch),
region (i.e. canton) and district (rural or urban). De-
scriptives for these variables can be found in tables
4 and 5 in the appendix.
Training Act or corresponding cantonal laws counts as an appren-
tice. People who complete a basic training (Anlehre) are also to
be counted as apprentices)
15 In Switzerland, large firm panels comparable with the IAB es-
tablishment panel for Germany are not available. Employer-em-
ployee matched data sets including a wide variety of variables on
firms as well as employees are also not known.
16 This share is computed as the number of training firms over
the number of all firms. Here, as throughout the paper, only pri-
vate firms are included.
17 The share of apprentices in a firm is computed as the number
of apprentices over the number of all employees (including ap-
prentices) in a firm.
18 Compare also footnote 8.Why has the share of training firms declined in Switzerland? Juerg Schweri and Barbara Mueller
We have the following hypotheses on how these var-
iables affect firms’ training activity: larger firms are
known to have a higher training propensity (Neu-
baeumer and Bellmann 1999, Franz and Zimmer-
mann 2000, Stoeger and Winter-Ebmer 2001). This
can be explained by two factors: first, larger firms
are more likely to have enough suitable work to be
able to use apprentices efficiently in the production
process. Second, they are also more likely to have a
vacancy for a skilled worker when the apprentice
has finished his training, providing the opportunity
to extract a rent from him (see section 1).
Different industries are shaped by different produc-
tion technologies and different skill needs. The
training strategies of firms will therefore differ be-
tween industries: in the construction industry, ap-
prentices can typically work productively early on.
Firms find it favourable to employ apprentices (in-
stead of unskilled workers with higher wages) and
should thus have a high training propensity. Services
have less tradition in apprenticeship training than
crafts and manufacturing and show less training ac-
tivity according to the descriptive statistics. We also
distinguish between traditional and modern services
and manufacturing. Modern services and manufac-
turing might operate in a faster changing environ-
ment, which impedes the training of apprentices
over several years. Single firms and headquarters
probably have a wider array of activities, whereas
specialised branches of a firm might show a smaller
propensity to train. For Swiss regions it is well
known that in the French and Italian speaking parts
there are more full-time vocational schools and
slightly fewer dual apprenticeship places. In rural
districts the reputation effects of apprenticeships
(with customers) might be more important, and
poaching might be less of a problem. In rural dis-
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tricts, we therefore expect the share of training firms
to be higher.
In order to include supply-side variables, we added
two demographic variables: the share of 16-year-
olds among the working-age population of a canton
and the share of grammar school pupils among the
16-year-olds of a canton. These variables were taken
from other data sets published by the Federal Statis-
tical Office. In the appendix, a table of frequencies
for all variables and all years can be found.
We use cantonal level variables since cantons form
strong political entities in Switzerland. They vary
markedly in the composition of their population.
Moreover, most competencies in educational poli-
cies reside with cantons and not with the federal au-
thorities. Therefore, the share of 16-year-olds as well
as the share of grammar school pupils among 16-
year-olds vary markedly between cantons.19
The rationale for including supply-side factors in the
estimations was discussed in the previous section
about the estimation strategy. Figure 3 shows that
demography is very likely to have a strong influence
on the variance in the outcomes of the apprentice-
ship market over time. The number of 16-year-olds
showed a significant downward trend from the early
eighties to the mid-nineties and rose again after-
wards. With a small time lag, the number of people
starting apprenticeships seems to mirror these
19 The share of 16-year-olds varies between 1.57 percent and 3.28
percent between cantons in 1985. The mean share of 2.27 percent
in 1985 dropped to 1.65 percent in 1995. The mean share of gram-
mar school pupils in Switzerland rose from 18.8 percent in 1985
to 25.5 percent in 2001. The minimum share in 2001 was 13.2
percent, the maximum 62.1 percent.Juerg Schweri and Barbara Mueller Why has the share of training firms declined in Switzerland?
trends. The share of training firms might therefore
be affected by the number of apprenticeship candi-
dates available on the market.
The share of 16-year-olds opting for grammar school
accounts for shifts in the preferences for general vs.
vocational education. An increase in the share of
grammar school pupils, as observed especially be-
tween 1985 and 1995, will reduce the number of can-
didates on the apprenticeship market and is there-
fore expected to lower the overall share of training
firms. Not including this variable might bias the time
dummies in our estimations, which we want to re-
flect possible time trends in firm behaviour.20
5 Results
Pooled estimations
Table 1 presents probit estimations for the full data
set (all firms, all years) where the dependent vari-
able is a dummy training variable. Marginal effects
are computed at the mean of the explanatory vari-
20 Including the share of grammar school pupils would be ques-
tionable if it was itself influenced by the outcome of the appren-
ticeship market. This would be the case if young people who do
not get an apprenticeship place went to grammar school instead.
This is unlikely, however: in the short run, grammar schools have
a given infrastructure and stock of teachers. The number of gram-
mar school places is therefore inelastic in the short run. Empirical
evidence supports this: both the number and the share of gram-
mar school pupils in the relevant age cohort change only gradu-
ally and do not show cyclical fluctuations. A study by the Federal
Statistical Office which aims to predict the development of pupil
numbers confirms that the number of grammar school pupils did
not depend on business cycles in the past (FSO 2004).
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ables. The first column contains a model that ex-
cludes supply-side factors. While firm characteristics,
industry and regional dummies all have significant
effects, they cannot fully explain the differences be-
tween the years. Controlling for these factors, the
training propensity of firms was still 3.9 percentage
points higher in 1985 than it was in 2001 (compared
with 7.1 percentage points difference in the descrip-
tive statistics, see figure 2).
The next column shows the results including supply-
side factors. Demographic development does have a
substantial significant effect, as can be seen from the
following illustration: from 1985 to 1995, the share
of sixteen-year-olds dropped from 2.27% to 1.65%
(for all of Switzerland). Based on model 2 in table
1, this decrease would ceteris paribus have caused a
drop in the share of training firms of 1.8 percentage
points.21 The share of grammar school pupils, how-
ever, did not have an effect on training propensity
according to this estimation.
While most of the coefficients do not react strongly
to the inclusion of these factors, the dummy for 1985
drops by more than half and is reduced from 3.9 to
1.8 percentage points. So the difference between
1985 and 2001 can now largely be explained by the
independent variables. Although demography does
not increase the goodness-of-fit, it does make an im-
portant difference for the conclusions that can be
drawn concerning the development of firms’ train-
21 The respective probabilities for these values of the demogra-
phy variable have been computed at the mean of all other varia-
bles.Why has the share of training firms declined in Switzerland? Juerg Schweri and Barbara Mueller
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ing propensity: An unexplained difference of
1.8 percentage points does not suggest a major
change in firms’ willingness to train. Furthermore,
another factor might be responsible for the remain-
ing differences, namely the business cycle. We do not
have firm level data on the course of business, but
it is striking that GDP growth had been high in the
years before 1985 whereas it was particularly low in
the early nineties. Without being able to test this
hypothesis, it offers a plausible explanation for the
differences. If the hypothesis is true, the dummies
would mainly reflect business cycle effects.
Apparently, demography might be less important
for the cross-section analysis of firms’ training pro-
pensity, but for the longitudinal analysis it is crucial.
In model 3, the industry dummies have been re-
duced to five dummies. This estimation shows a
clearly smaller goodness-of-fit; it is therefore only
used to give some results concerning industries,
otherwise the coefficients of model 2 are regarded
as more reliable. In comparison with the traditional
services (reference group), firms in the construction
sector show a higher training propensity, whereas
modern services and modern manufacturing exhibit
lower training propensities. Further analysis with a
dummy variable indicating new firms, i.e. firms that
had not been observed in the earlier periods, show
that these differences are mainly due to the fact that
young firms cluster in the modern industries of the
economy.22 Young firms are less likely to train ap-
prentices if there are fixed costs associated with en-
gaging in training for the first time (mainly transac-
tion costs and investment in training instructors).
Fixed-effects estimations
The last two columns of table 1 present results of
the fixed-effects estimations. Model 4 shows the un-
derlying, pooled linear probability model. The mar-
ginal effects of the LPM model are very close to
those of the probit model 2, with the notable excep-
tion of the share of grammar school pupils, which
has a counterintuitive positive sign. The fixed-effects
estimates in model 5, however, yield the expected
negative sign for the share of grammar school pupils.
The only other major change compared with the
LPM model and the probit models occurs with firm
size: the dummy coefficients decrease, that is the
dummies for small firms show a massive decline in
coefficient size. It seems that the firm-size coeffi-
22 The variable “new firm“ is usually not included in the estima-
tions because one loses the data for 1985: it is not known how old
firms were in 1985 since there was no earlier firm census. The
results of these analyses can be found in Mueller and Schweri
2006.
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cients absorb quite a lot of unobserved cross-sec-
tional heterogeneity. These coefficient estimates
should not be interpreted causally, however; the
training propensity of growing or shrinking firms
change on much smaller scales, as the fixed-effects
estimates show.
The effect of the demography variable is confirmed
in model 5, and the coefficient is even higher than
in the pooled probit models (though slightly smaller
than in the LPM model 4). The change in demogra-
phy between 1985 and 1995, which would have
caused a drop in the share of training firms of
1.8 percentage points according to model 2, now
suggests a decrease of 2.7 percentage points.
Moreover, the year dummy estimates of the probit
models also hold in the panel regression. The longi-
tudinal conclusions of the pooled model are thus
confirmed: the decrease in the share of training
firms can be largely explained by a combination of
demand-side, supply-side and regional factors. There
is no evidence of a steady downward trend in firms’
willingness to train since training propensity in-
creased after 1995.
Model 6 introduces interaction effects between de-
mography and the five aggregated industry dummies
into the fixed-effects estimation. While time-fixed
variables such as industry dummies cannot have
their own partial effect on the change of the depen-
dent variable over time, time-variant variables such
as demography might for example have a differen-
tial effect in different industries. Indeed, column 6
shows that the effect of demography is stronger in
the construction sector than in other industries.23
This seems plausible since in the construction sector
there is an excess of training places. The occupations
offered by this sector seem to be less attractive to
young people. On the other hand, these occupations
are very profitable for the firms, since the main con-
struction occupations such as mason and electrician
generate high net returns for firms. Therefore, con-
struction firms are most ready to employ (more) ap-
prentices when there are more young people on the
market. Though these results are interesting in
themselves, the inclusion of the interaction effects
had no impact on the other coefficients.
Decomposition analysis
So far, we have seen that there remains a rather
small, though significant difference between the
years 1985 and 2001 as measured by a year dummy.
23 All of the interaction coefficients are significantly different
from each other.Why has the share of training firms declined in Switzerland? Juerg Schweri and Barbara Mueller
With the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition discussed
in section 3, we can try to shed more light on the
explanatory power of the independent variables
used in the analyses. As a starting point, we predict
the share of training firms based on the different
combinations of data and coefficients for the 4
points in time under consideration. For instance, the
probit coefficients resulting from the cross-section
estimation with 1985 data will be combined with the
2001 values of the independent variables to predict
the share of training firms in 2001. This procedure
provides an answer to the question: if firm behav-
iour (as expressed by probit coefficients) were the
same in 2001 as in 1985, but the firm composition24
of the economy changed, what would the share of
training firms be?
The fixed-effects estimation in table 1 showed that
firm-size coefficients changed compared with the
probit estimations and the latter should not be inter-
24 The same holds for structural changes on the supply side.
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preted causally. Is our decomposition biased since it
is based on these cross-sectional probit estimates?
Recall that what we are looking for is the best pre-
diction of the share in 2001, assuming that firm be-
haviour did not change. As regards firm size, we
know that from 1985 to 2001, many very small firms
newly entered the market.25 The question now is
whether the firm-size coefficients in the 1985 probit
provide a good representation of the new firms’
training propensity in order to predict the effect of
the increase in the number of small firms. If these
new small firms behave as the small firms in 1985
did, the coefficients of 1985 provide a good predic-
tion of the training propensity of these new firms.26
If, however, new small firms are systematically dif-
ferent from existing small firms (with respect to
25 The trend towards a larger share of very small firms is well
documented (FSO 2000). These firms mainly originate in the ex-
panding service sector.
26 Note that best prediction does not imply causality. The ex-
planatory contribution of the firm-size variables should therefore
not be interpreted causally. Instead, firm size serves as proxy for
different unobserved firm characteristics.Juerg Schweri and Barbara Mueller Why has the share of training firms declined in Switzerland?
their training behaviour), the prediction based on
the 1985 coefficients is not valid. Then, the part ex-
plained by firm size might be too high in the decom-
position.
The discussion in the previous paragraph highlights
the main assumption of the decomposition analysis:
we assume that the behaviour of the firms as repre-
sented by the cross-section coefficient estimates is
constant over time. Given this assumption, we show
to what extent the change in the share of training
firms over time can be explained by changes in the
independent variables.
Table 2 displays the actual share of training firms
and predictions of this share based on different data
combinations. The third column presents predictions
based on coefficients from a probit with the 1985
data. The 1985 probit equation was used to predict
the share of training firms in the year 1995 using the
values for the independent variables in 1995. The
share for the year 1998 was predicted using the val-
ues of the independent variables in 1998 etc. The
predictions using the 1985 coefficients and the 2001
data (i.e. 0.219 and 0.179 respectively) correspond
exactly with the computation of the first term in the
second bracket of formula (5) (see section 3). The
upper panel of the table presents predictions based
on cross-section probits without supply-side varia-
bles, but with firm characteristics (firm size, industry,
firm type) and region dummies as independent vari-
ables. The lower panel of the table presents the
same predictions, but including supply-side factors
(share of 16-year-olds and share of grammar school
pupils) in the probits from which the coefficients are
taken.
The predictions in the upper panel of table 2 are not
particularly good. The predicted difference between
the share of training firms in 1985 and 2001 esti-
mated with the different cross-section coefficients
lies between Ð2.6 and Ð3.3 percentage points,
whereas the real difference amounts to Ð7.1 per-
centage points.
In the lower panel of table 2, the predicted differen-
ces are between -6.8 and -9.1 percentage points. So
these predictions are much closer to the true value,
which shows again that supply-side factors are im-
portant factors that should be included in longitudi-
nal analyses. It is striking, however, to see that the
coefficients of the 1985, 1998 and 2001 models pro-
vide good predictions for all years with the excep-
tion of 1995. Conversely, the 1995 coefficients gener-
ate clearly lower predictions for all years. The “out-
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lier” 1995 may be due to the exclusion of business
cycle effects, as mentioned earlier.27
For the next step, we calculate the contribution of
each independent variable to the total predicted dif-
ference between 1985 and 2001 using 1985 coeffi-
cients.28 Table 3 shows what contribution the differ-
ent independent variables make to explaining the
total predicted difference of Ð6.8 percentage points
(see table 2).29
Changes in four variables contribute significantly to
the explained change from 1985 to 2001: firm size,
industry, demography and the share of grammar
school pupils. The structure of the Swiss economy
with regard to firm-size composition and, to a lesser
extent, industry composition has thus changed in a
way that has led to a decrease in the share of train-
ing firms, even though ceteris paribus the training
propensity of individual firms had not changed.
27 Another explanation might be measurement error: The num-
ber of apprentices that was reported by firms in 1995 is slightly
lower than the number of apprentices according to other data of
the Federal Statistical Office, while the figures are quite close for
other years. The FSO does not have an explanation for this, how-
ever, and we could not find any obvious distortion for particular
subgroups in the 1995 data.
28 The predicted difference results from 0.247 Ð 0.179 = 0.068,
see column three in table 2. The probit output for 1985 data can
be seen in the appendix (table 6).
29 Since the results of a non-linear decomposition for the contri-
bution of each variable to the gap may be sensitive to the order-
ing of variables, we followed the procedure used by Fairlie (2003)
and randomized the ordering of switching distributions by using
a large number of simulations. The point estimates are the mean
results of a process that is replicated 1000 times.Why has the share of training firms declined in Switzerland? Juerg Schweri and Barbara Mueller
These demand-side factors explain nearly half of the
change (42%). Supply-side factors, namely demog-
raphy and the share of grammar school pupils, ex-
plain the larger part (58%). This result again sup-
ports our view that supply-side factors should not
be ignored when analysing the developments on the
apprenticeship market.
6 Discussion and conclusions
The share of firms training apprentices is an indica-
tor that receives much public attention in Switzer-
land. The indicator shows a decline of 7.1 percent-
age points from 1985 to 2001, the first and (up to
now) the most recent years for which data are avail-
able. This has often been interpreted as a sign of
firms’ reduced involvement in apprenticeship train-
ing. The variation over time in the share of training
firms has been analysed in this paper with pooled
probit models, fixed-effects models and a non-linear
decomposition technique. The main findings are that
the unexplained part of the difference between 1985
and 2001 reduces to about 0.5 to 2 percentage
points in the different models when all available in-
dependent variables are controlled for. There is no
clear trend in the unexplained part that would indi-
cate a (negative or positive) trend in the individual
firms’ willingness to train apprentices.
Part of the decline between 1985 and 2001 can be
explained by demand-side factors. Changes in the
firm size and Ð to a lesser extent Ð the industry
composition of the Swiss economy have led to a de-
crease in the share of training firms. Including sup-
ply-side factors, namely the share of sixteen-year-
olds in the working-age population as well as the
share of grammar school pupils, allows us to explain
most of the variation. These supply-side factors pro-
vide more than half of the explanation for the ob-
served decline according to a decomposition analy-
sis.
These results are important for policy making since
the observed decline in the share of training firms
has been used repeatedly as an argument in favour
of policy intervention. Do the factors we have found
to explain the decline warrant new policy interven-
tions and regulations? One major reason for the de-
cline in the share of training firms is the increase in
the share of very small firms in the economy. Since
the increase is mainly due to new, additional very
small firms, the increase does not crowd out appren-
ticeship places and does not constitute a serious
challenge for the apprenticeship system. The chang-
ing industry structure has had a moderate effect on
162 ZAF 2 und 3/2007
the change in the share of training firms. We do not
find a major role of this factor which is often men-
tioned in conjunction with global trends such as “the
knowledge society” and such like. Nevertheless, the
increasing share of modern service firms might be a
challenge for the apprenticeship system in the future
since modern services traditionally have lower train-
ing propensities than other industries. It is important
that the existing regulations, namely the training
regulations that shape every occupation, remain up-
to-date and flexible enough to adapt to new devel-
opments in the economy.30
Turning to supply-side factors, we found a decline in
the share of training firms due to changes in demog-
raphy. This proves the flexibility of the (market-
based) system and is no reason for worries. The in-
creasing share of young people choosing grammar
school instead of vocational training is another rea-
son for the decrease in the share of training firms,
though the results were less unequivocal than for
firm size, industries and demography. If the share of
grammar school pupils increases in the future, this
will obviously have an influence on the apprentice-
ship system. But a change in the firms’ demand for
human capital, i.e. a possible substitution of appren-
tices with grammar school pupils, again provides no
reason for state intervention in order to increase the
share of training firms. If, however, the state ex-
pands grammar schools without a change in firms’
human capital needs, this might deprive the appren-
ticeship market of highly performing youngsters and
thus reduce the training propensity of those firms
that offer apprenticeship places for high performers.
To sum up, the factors we have identified as causing
the decline in the share of training firms do not, in
our view, call for new state interventions.
All the same, there is a rather small, but not negligi-
ble group of young people that do not find appren-
ticeship places and do not follow post-compulsory
education. We have shown that there is no negative
time trend in firms’ willingness to train apprentices.
Why then do not all young people find an appren-
ticeship place? The most likely explanation is mis-
match problems, since at the same time, thousands
of apprenticeship places remain vacant every year.
Either young people do not find vacancies close to
their place of residence (regional mismatch); or they
look for places in other occupations, where no va-
cant places are available; or they did not acquire the
30 Actually, the Swiss Federal Office of Professional Education
and Technology is currently modernising the training regulations
for all roughly 250 occupations, together with employer associa-
tions and cantons.Juerg Schweri and Barbara Mueller Why has the share of training firms declined in Switzerland?
necessary qualifications in compulsory school for
the vacant places (skills mismatch).
Future empirical research should address this ques-
tion and test whether mismatch phenomena can ex-
plain why some young people do not acquire a post-
compulsory education. Further research topics in-
clude the impact of the business cycle on the appren-
ticeship market and the behaviour of firms in the
public sector. Ideal employer-employee matched
data would also permit the inclusion of individual
characteristics of apprentices and apprenticeship
candidates in the analyses, such that a system of de-
mand and supply functions as outlined in section 3
could be estimated.
We do not claim to have analysed all of the challen-
ges for the apprenticeship market in this paper, but
have focused on one indicator, the share of training
firms, which is prominently discussed in Swiss media
and politics. We have shown that the decline in the
share of training firms in itself is not a sufficient ar-
gument for policy interventions. The decline can
largely be explained by the emergence of new, very
small firms and by supply-side factors such as de-
mography. The latter factors have to be included in
a longitudinal analysis to provide a complete and
undistorted picture of the developments on the ap-
prenticeship market over time.
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